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Lessons China Can Learn from the East Asian Financial Crisis: 
A Comparative Study of the Pre-Crisis East Asian and Modern-Day Chinese Economies 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to deliver a side-by-side examination of the similarities and 
differences between the economies of East Asia (Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea 
Republic, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) and China. After the 
devastating 1997 Crisis, many investing eyes have turned to China as the next Asian 
growth engine. China has been opening its economy to foreign investors and its accession 
into the World Trade Organization will push for increased transparency and efficiency. 
The paper discusses the internal and external forces that drove the economies, with 
focused attention on its financial systems, using pre-crisis data. With foreign banks 
allowed entry into China by the end of 2006, its financial system will be an important 
component in economic longevity. Lastly, the question of whether or not China is 
vulnerable to a crisis is assessed based on the same factors that caused it in East Asia.  
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Lessons China Can Learn from the East Asian Financial Crisis: 
 
A Comparative Study of the Pre-Crisis East Asian and Modern-Day Chinese Economies   
 
Some selective interventions contributed to growth, and it advances our understanding of 
the conditions required for interventions to succeed. It is argued that where selective 
interventions succeeded they did so because of three essential prerequisites. First, they 
addressed problems in the functioning of markets. Second, they took place within the 
context of good, fundamental policies. Third, their success depended on the ability of 
governments to establish and monitor appropriate economic-performance criteria related 
to the interventions – to create economic contests. 
- Lewis T. Preston 
The World Bank (President) 
August 1993 
 
 Preston’s words ring quite lucidly when placed in the context of overseas markets: 
excellent examples of these are the Chinese economy and the economies of the East 
Asian Tiger1 nations.  The excerpt above refers specifically to the reforms needed to 
continue  what has been dubbed the “East Asian Miracle.” Recently, a statement by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had named three 
pre-conditions for sustained progress and growth in the Chinese economy: restore 
solvency to the financial system, bolster market based mechanisms as a dominant force 
for restructuring of the business sector, and establish public finances on a sound and 
sustainable basis (OECD, 2003). In simple terms, reform in the banking system and 
capital markets must take place, reforms in state-owned enterprises must create 
economically efficient contests, and accession into the WTO must force the economy to 
follow strict guidelines in regulation and reporting. The East Asian (EA) countries were 
considered an economic miracle: their high growth rates demanded acute attention. 
However, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 had led scholars to believe otherwise. It is 
                                                
1 *In addition to the four Tiger economies (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore), I have also included 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, all of which demonstrated similar growth patterns in the 1980’s and 
1990’s and lend significantly to this analysis. 
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undeniable that these economies pursued export-oriented growth; however, it may have 
been those same principles that caused the crisis to be so severe and crippling. The Asian 
Miracle was purported to be the “model” for other developing nations:  the collapse of 
those same “miracle” economies suggest that it may not necessarily be replicated.  
 The purpose of this paper is to examine the similarities and differences between 
the East Asian economies and China prior to the financial crisis. The latter has also 
experienced high GDP growth rates over the span of two decades and the future of its 
economy will have a significant impact on not only the Asian markets but the global 
market. 
Using the East Asian miracle as a simple model, it is my intention to clarify the 
similarities and differences of that said “miracle” to the current condition of the Chinese 
economy. Some of those similarities include the areas of human capital and education, 
while the main difference lies mainly in the respective types of government. A major 
factor in the collapse of the Tigers as a whole was the unseen weakness of the banking 
system and the lack of necessary reserves to save their currency from collapse. The 
question I propose to answer is: upon looking at the factors involved in affecting the 
crisis, is China on a similar path to crisis? If so, can it be avoided? If not, why and how is 
it safe from crisis? It is not  the objective to predict the future of the country’s economy 
but  to identify the subtle parallels and nuances and define how related the two may be. 
 
Brief History of the East Asian Financial Crisis 
 While there are many factors that contributed to the Crisis, there are four key 
components that led to the 1997 Financial Crisis that should be identified as most 
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important in its viral spread throughout East Asia. First, there was a lack of adequate 
hedging involved when financial institutions and corporations had borrowed in foreign 
currencies. This made these countries vulnerable to sudden currency depreciation via 
speculative attacks. Many of the countries who were devastated by the crisis had 
inadequate amounts of foreign reserves and did not have the necessary capacity to buy 
back its currency during the downward pressures.  Second, much of the debt was short-
term debt while the assets were longer-term. This created the chance for an attack on 
liquidity, essentially the same effect as a run on the bank. Once an attack on a currency 
occurred, it made it difficult to pay off short-term debt because most of the debt was 
financed through foreign currency. Third, there was a spike in the countries’ equity and 
real estate markets before the crisis, which increased the possibility of an unexpected 
deflation in asset prices. Lastly, credit was poorly distributed increasing the problems at 
banks and other financial institutions before the crisis (Lane, 1999). 
 
China, At First Glance 
 At first glance, China has a relatively large pool of foreign reserves due to the fact 
that they fixed the value of the renminbi (or Yuan) to the United States dollar. In fact, 
China owns over one-third of U.S. government securities. The fixed exchange rate 
system was beneficial to China as the U.S. was the destination for most of its exports. 
This has changed slightly in the July 2005 when China decided to use a basket of 
currencies that included the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the Euro, the Korean won, and 
other non-disclosed currencies (Cosgrove, 2005). It appears that China has sufficiently 
hedged its currency against any sudden devaluation and is prepared to hold firm to its 
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recent revaluation, which coincided in with the change to a basket of currencies. By 
doing so, it can be speculated that China is acknowledging its global exports, not just to 
the U.S., and also diversifying its reserves by including other currencies. 
 Second, there has been an increasing number of non-performing loans during the 
Chinese economic expansion. China has been facing a serious dilemma due to its highly 
inefficient state-owned enterprises. Rather than being financed through a government 
budget, it has relied on loans from the four state-owned banks (Goldstein and Institute for 
International Economics (U.S.), 1998). The Big Four banks are now laden with a large 
amount of non-performing loans that either is equivalent to or greater than the amount of 
the worst East Asian countries before the 1997 crisis (Ernst & Young, 2002). 
Thirdly, it appears as though the Hong Kong, Taiwanese, and Chinese equity 
markets are on the rise, there has been an increase in the number of initial public 
offerings over the last decade, and real estate markets have also been increasing. This 
follows a similar pattern in which the Tigers’ assets began to appreciate before the crash. 
China’s Class A shares, listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen and denominated in Yuan, have 
risen almost 30% between June 2005 and February 2006 (Browne, 2006). Currently,  
however, a significant worry over the Chinese stock market is that foreign investment has 
been the main cause in the surge in growth rather than domestic investment being the 
major driver. This follows a familiar pattern where foreigners signal to buy when 
domestic confidence is at its bottom. In fact, securities analysts say that foreign buying 
cannot and will not sustain the Chinese stock market rally. 
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Also in China, there has been a rapid increase in listed companies from 1991 to 
20022. Hong Kong, now a part of China, historically has a similar positive trend, along 
with the other East Asian countries such as the Korea Republic and Malaysia. Japan is 
used as a reference, in order to compare the examined countries to a larger, more 
developed economy. In 1991, China had only fourteen listed companies, and this amount 
has increased tremendously to 1,235 listed domestic companies. Despite the growth in 
listed companies in Hong Kong, China, as of 2002, has more listed companies than Hong 
Kong. 
 
Table 1. Listed Domestic Companies, Total 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
CHINA 14 52 183 291 323 540 743 853 950 1,086 1,154 1,235 
HONG KONG 333 386 450 529 518 561 671 693 717 779 857 968 
             
JAPAN 2,107 2,118 2,155 2,205 2,263 2,334 2,387 2,416 2,470 2,561 2,471 3,058 
KOREA 686 688 693 699 721 760 776 748 1,178 1,308 1,390 1,518 
MALAYSIA 321 369 410 478 529 621 708 736 757 795 804 865 
             
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators        
 
 The real estate market in China has also been an attractive investment as several 
United States investment banks have made efforts to take hold of the new market. Sonny 
Kalsi, global head of real estate business at Morgan Stanley, plans to invest three times 
more into the Chinese property, while pulling away from Japan, an amount of $3 billion 
(Chu and Yasu, 2006). Morgan Stanley hopes that the economic expansion will lead to 
property price appreciation as well. Property values in Shanghai have tripled in the last 
six years, while Japanese prices have just begun to rise for the first time since the early 
1990’s. Goldman Sachs Strategic Investments (Asia) LLC, a subsidiary of Goldman 
                                                
2 See Table 1. Listed Domestic Companies, Total. 
 9 
Sachs Group, has invested $22 million in Century21 China Real Estate, one of the 
world’s most recognized real estate brands in mainland China ("Century21 China Real 
Estate Joins Hands with Goldman Sachs," 2006).  
 Finally, it is well documented that credit has been inadequately allocated, which 
has affected the increasing number of non-performing loans in China. The reforms in the 
state-owned enterprise sector and other government-run enterprises have caused some 
issues in resolving the debt issue and the misallocation of resources to failing firms. If all 
of these four factors have a similar effect on the Chinese economy as it did in the East 
Asian countries, one may feel a bit more cautious and less optimistic about the future of 
the behemoth country and investing there. 
 
Human Capital 
  Efficient resource utilization has played a major role in the growth of the East 
Asian economies. Human capital or labor was an especially strong contributor to the 
“miracle growth.” But although human capital accumulation may be a necessary 
condition for sustained rapid growth of output and wages, it is not a sufficient condition 
(World Bank, 1993). Therefore, human capital by itself cannot explain the growth.  
  It seems as though the countries who have invested in its education system have 
also had high economic growth rates associated with them. Public spending on education 
as a percentage of GDP shows how much investment each country adds to its education 
system. Economic historians including Crafts (1999) and Abramovitz (1986) argue that 
the standard of education is an important component in explaining the differences in the 
experience of catch-up growth. Japan, Korea Republic, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand 
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and Singapore have very high rates compared to China and Sri Lanka3. Malaysia and 
Japan have spent 6.14 percent and 3.56 percent of its GDP, respectively, on educating its 
citizens. This is over 1.5 percentage points higher than that of China. Korea, who is noted 
for its investment in education, spent 3.81 percent of its GDP. Hong Kong and Thailand 
double the amount of spending on education than China. It is interesting to see that the 
East Asian countries in this study have all invested significantly more in its education 
than China.  
 
Table 2. Public Spending on Education (as a % of GDP) 
         
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001  Average 
China 2.00 2.08 -- --  2.04 
        
Hong Kong -- -- 3.99 4.11  4.05 
Korea 3.74 3.76 3.44 4.31  3.81 
Sri Lanka 3.05 -- -- --  3.05 
Malaysia 4.78 5.69 6.20 7.89  6.14 
Thailand 5.00 5.74 5.23 --  5.32 
Japan 3.52 3.60 3.56 --  3.56 
        
Least Developed Countries 2.53 2.49 3.13 --  2.72 
         
-- denotes no available data for particular year        
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators         
 
 The above table suggests that education and training played an integral role in the 
success of the East Asian economies (Green et al., 1999). It is also clear that education 
has a positive effect on growth; however, it may have had a greater effect on social 
capability rather than directly affecting total factor productivity (Crafts, 1999). China’s 
current growth cannot be explained by its educational spending like the other EA 
economies. This suggests that Chinese education may not play a role in growth. Even the 
least developed countries, as classified by the United Nations, have spent more money 
                                                
3 See Table 2. Public Spending on Education 
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(2.72 percent of GDP) than China. Therefore, there must be other factors in place that 
explain the situation in China.  
This unique trend can be observed because in some cases, schooling and training 
are not necessary for certain types of jobs. For example, in an agricultural based economy, 
there is little need for a well-educated labor force. In a service-based economy, it is 
imperative for a labor force to have secondary and tertiary levels of education. If this is 
true, China’s employment breakdown by sector may provide some evidence on why 
China spends little on education.  
 
Employment by Sector 
 One of China’s markedly problematic areas is that employment in its agricultural 
sector is much larger than the East Asian countries. Over the past twenty years, China has 
decreased its employment in agriculture by over 20 percent4, a positive trend for long 
term growth. This has also been the case for the East Asian countries,  just not as drastic 
as China’s situation. However, China still lags far behind in the share of employment in 
services with only 27 percent. Korea, Singapore, and Japan have less than ten percent of 
its labor force in agriculture. This may explain why they are spending a larger percent of 
GDP on education compared to China and why China spends only an average of 2.04 
percent. As noted earlier, education is imperative for the workforce employed in industry 
and services.  As education spending increases, there is less incentive to increase 
agricultural needs because there is less need of education in agriculture.  
Agriculture and food production play a significant role in all large–scale 
economies. A country the size of China must be able to feed its people first. Perhaps this 
                                                
4 See Table 3a. Employment by Sector (Appendix – page 38). 
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is the reason why Korea, Singapore, and Japan show a decrease in arable land over the 
last twenty years, while China is shown to have increased its arable land percentage5. 
Education spending levels may still be low because the Chinese population still needs 
those workers in agriculture, especially with over one billion people in the population. 
One would rather have enough food to eat than a new consumer product. 
 China’s agriculture is characterized by scarce land in relation to labor and is 
notorious for small-scale production using little or no mechanization. In Japan and Korea, 
output per land is high while output per worker is low, meaning machinery and 
agricultural techniques have maximized production (Pigott and Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002). In order for improvement in 
productivity to occur, it is necessary that there is considerable reallocation of resources 
away from land-intensive products toward labor-intensive products. This may pose a 
threat to improving productivity, however. If China is increasing its arable land area, then 
less investment can go into the labor-intensive products, which can help its comparative 
advantage. By doing so, China will be able to trade for any necessary agricultural 
products, similar to the system Japan utilizes today. 
 
Private-Public Sector Cooperation 
 Cooperation between the private and public sector was a crucial factor in 
facilitating communication and progress in the EA countries. These are, in effect, an 
institutionalized form of wealth sharing aimed primarily at winning the support and 
cooperation of business elites (World Bank, 1993).  
                                                
5 See Table 3d. Arable Land (Appendix – page 39). 
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  From the mid-60’s until the early 80’s, Korean businesses and the Korean 
government worked closely and cooperatively with each other. The president of Korea 
would preside over discussions between government economic ministers and country’s 
top business leaders. It was a forum where businessmen shared their views on the 
markets and future outlook. The president then delegated a minister to a specific issue 
and by the next meeting; a progress report was delivered and logged. In Malaysia, in 
1991 under Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohamad’s “Look East Policy,” formal 
meetings between the government and industry leaders began. They gathered to discuss 
the national budget with finance officials. Mahathir also created the Malaysian Business 
Council which included sixty members from industry, labor, and the government. In 1983, 
Thailand’s government established the National Joint Public and Private Consultative 
Committee (NJPPCC).  The committee consisted of the prime minister as chairman, top 
government officials, and nine private sector representatives from the Thai Chamber of 
Commerce, the Association of Thai Industries, and the Thai Bankers Association. 
 Like  the others, Singapore has a similar mechanism in place. However, it is 
system is more  pronounced than its neighbors. The National Wages Council, which 
include representatives from government, business, and labor cover several coordination 
functions, including business-labor cooperation. An example of this public-private 
consultation is that private citizens serve as directors of government statutory boards and 
as members of ad hoc government committees. 
 Taiwan and Indonesia do not have formal mechanisms for public-private 
coordination. In Taiwan, the reason is because the governing party tends to have large, 
sensitive investments and a means to influence the generally smaller firms that make up 
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the private sector. Like Taiwan, Hong Kong uses a more laissez faire approach to its 
economy (Crafts, 1999). Indonesia lacks this mechanism due to its weakness in 
bureaucracy. Coordination is handled by informal networks instead, which link senior 
officials with large businesses. 
 These mechanisms assist in facilitating information transmission. The government 
can assess information about the world markets, innovative trends, impact of regulations, 
while communicating back to the private sector. The key is credibility, because the 
private sector participants will believe cheating is less likely if backed by government 
(World Bank, 1993). With established rules made with the participation of businesses, 
members can focus on market competition. Industry profits will be determined by 
competition and not rent-seeking. 
 Taiwan and Hong Kong, both countries that used a more laissez faire mechanism 
rather than the public-private consultations, basically came out of the Asian Financial 
Crisis unscathed. By letting the economics of business take its course, the hands-off 
approach may have helped the two countries adjust more quickly than the others. Korea 
and Thailand, who were heavily involved in its private sector, were devastated by the 
1997 Crisis, perhaps because they were less willing to adjust to changing market 
conditions. Singapore’s story is more difficult to explain as its government was also in 
close relations with its business firms. This may lead to another factor pointing at the 
quality of institutions and governments discussed further along.  
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China’s Business Integration: State-owned Enterprises 
 Like the East Asian countries, China is also involved in its private sector. 
However, unlike the former, instead of having deliberations between the government and 
industry leaders, China owns those businesses. This is a major difference in that China 
has full control over what happens in its private sector. 
 However, these state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have had an immense positive 
effect on economic growth  earlier on. The first reform involved the household 
responsibility system, where land was assigned to a household according to the number 
of members and workers. The next reform was that of the state-owned enterprises which 
took place in three phases. First, from 1978-1984, the focus was to grant SOEs more 
autonomy in exchange for higher efficiency (Lin et al., 1996). Macmillan and Naughton 
(1992) state, “China’s state-owned are notoriously inefficient; press reports commonly 
describe them as ‘dinosaurs’ or ‘terminally ill’.”(Macmillan and Naughton, 1992) By 
sharing power and profit between government and the SOEs, its aim was to see managers 
and workers put in extra effort in production and make more efficient uses of resources, 
thereby increasing social welfare and individual income at the same time. The second 
phase’s goals were to simplify administrative control, decentralize authority, reform 
taxation, and introduce management-responsibility systems. This came in response to 
emerging non-state enterprises (or township and village enterprises), who achieved a 
higher degree of efficiency and could afford to buy resources at higher prices. As a result 
of the entry of these new firms and state firms were selling on free markets, SOEs now 
encounter product-market competition in a socialist economy. The last phase was the 
implementation of the management-responsibility system, which included the contract 
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system and experiments on a shareholding system (Lin et al., 1996). Now, this semi-
market-based competition has given SOEs an incentive to improve its productivity. 
 By owning its enterprises, China chose to have a more hands-on approach in its 
private sector.  The pros and cons of this angle demands examination. The pro is that the 
government can assign managers to these businesses, which will follow the growth plans 
it wishes to take as a country. The assigned managers may have only one objective in 
mind, which could be to follow the exact orders of the government. The con is that these 
managers may not be experienced or well-educated individuals capable of running a 
business. Following government orders may not be the most efficient way of handling a 
business.  
 In fact, major weaknesses in the Chinese industry are inadequate technology and 
limited capacity to innovate (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2003). These inefficiencies are closely tied to factors at the firm level. The poorly skilled 
and insufficiently profit-motivated management has neglected a push in technology. 
Government involvement has led to poor SOE management and inefficient operations, 
which cultivate lower profits and higher debt. It resulted in making the restructuring 
process more difficult and forces the government to appropriate resources from stronger 
enterprises to aid those which are failing. The problem with SOEs is so grave that it has 
also constrained the financial system (to be discussed later). 
 
Institutional Quality 
 Institutional quality is one measurement of government performance. The World 
Bank’s institutional quality index is ranked from 1 to 100, the larger value being the 
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better performer. It is no argument that a well-run economy also has a well-run 
government. Table 46 ranks the institutional quality of the East Asian countries and also 
adds Argentina and Japan as controls, a country who has struggled throughout the years 
to entertain economic growth on a prolonged basis and a country who has one of the 
largest economies in the world. Argentina, over the last two decades has placed last 
(eighth) out of eight. Japan, on the other hand, has averaged the highest score7, 1.2, 
signifying that since 1985, it has managed to have the highest institutional quality among 
the eight countries in the table. Singapore ranks second with an average score of 2.2. 
Hong Kong ranks third with a 3.6 score. Korea and Malaysia are tied for fourth with an 
average score of 4. Thailand scored a 6 placing it in sixth. Lastly China scored a 6.4, a 
seventh overall ranking.  
According to Dekle and Kletzer (2001), this result closely coincides with the fact 
that Korea and Thailand experienced crisis, Malaysia experienced a near-crisis, and 
Singapore and Hong Kong essentially escaped from the crisis unscathed, compared to the 
other East Asian countries inflicted, that is. Singapore and Hong Kong rank highest, then 
comes Malaysia and Korea, with Thailand in last. China’s low ranking cannot be a good 
indicator of government performance. 
 As mentioned earlier, the Tigers’ social capability was a key factor in increasing 
growth. However, Crafts (1999) and Abramovitz (1986) argue that social capability must 
include the role of institutions and incentive structures, not just education, which has 
already been suggested. This involves rent-seeking, the political process, and the ability 
of vested interests to prevent modernization. Also, a central component to investment is 
                                                
6 Table 4 Institutional Quality Rankings (Appendix – page 40). 
7 Ranked second only in 2002. 
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the appropriation of profits. Essentially, this means that political and institutional 
structures must permit a strongly restrained, predictable government. Governments must 
protect property rights and enforce contracts while removing itself from expropriation 
and capricious behavior. 
 
Research and Development 
 It has been found that research and development (R&D) was not in the interest of 
the East Asian countries (Vines, 2000). During the Asian miracle, when foreign funds 
were pouring into the region and no shortage of capital to spend, expenditures on R&D 
either remained relatively low by international standards; some even showed some 
decline. Why should one bother to invest capital in R&D, promising long-term returns, 
when fortunes could be made overnight in the stock markets or in the property markets? 
 Malaysia and Hong Kong’s R&D expenditures have remained relatively low. This 
is low for Hong Kong seeing that it prides itself on running a technologically advanced 
economy. In 1997, they spent a mere 0.27 percent of GDP on R&D and only raised it to 
0.44 percent the following year. In Singapore, where the government gives extensive 
incentives for R&D activity, the data is still unimpressive. By 2005, the national target is 
only 2 percent of GDP (Lo, 1999). These figures are no where near those of the U.S. or 
Japan, its Asian competitor. 
 The global leader in R&D is Sweden, who devotes around 3 percent of GDP to 
the cause. Japan has bettered Sweden at times and spent 3.09 percent of GDP on research. 
South Korea, the other Asian leader in R&D, spent 2.80 percent on R&D expenditures8. 
It turns out that Japan and Korea Republic are the only two Asian countries with well-
                                                
8 See Table 9. Research and Development (Appendix – page 44). 
 19
recognized global brand-label companies. Examples of such companies include Sony, 
Panasonic, and Toyota in Japan and Samsung, LG, and Hyundai in Korea. Also, Japanese 
companies have taken its R&D departments overseas where they can tap into sources and 
expertise not available in its own country. 
 China shows a gradual increase in its R&D expenditures spending 0.60 percent in 
1996 and 1.09 percent in 2001. Research and development is necessary in that it can help 
determine long-term growth for the economy. In developing countries, once the “catch-
up growth” has fully taken place, it is imperative for a developing country to be able to 
sustain its own growth via new innovation and technology, especially in the industrial 
and services sectors. China still has an “advantage of backwardness” or “economic 
backwardness,” however. Because independent R&D by self-investment is extremely 
costly with little success, China has learned innovation through imitating or purchasing 
advanced technologies from other well-developed countries. Since purchasing patents for 
new innovation is only one-third the price for R&D on these developments, it is cheaper 
and also provides a proven track-record of success. Therefore, it is important for China to 
develop products that they can export, by perhaps selling these same products for cheaper. 
By doing so, it must exploit its price comparative advantage. However, “there is likely to 
be a downside in terms of weaknesses in productivity performance,” according Crafts 
(David, Thomas and British Academy, 2003). This occurs if the workers cannot use new 
technology to its fullest potential. Research and development is needed to have products 
that will be attractive to the consumer and also provides an avenue for upcoming 
entrepreneurs to invent new technologies that can better society. 
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 Just recently in the news, “a Chinese company’s plan to acquire IBM’s 
(International Business Machines) personal computer division is just one example of 
current Chinese efforts to buy or build recognizable brand names in the United States.” 
Lenovo’s purchase of IBM’s personal computer division will be “a sign of things to 
come” according to Dr. Oded Shenkar at Ohio State University. As mentioned above, 
Chinese companies have been buying what it cannot produce, like Japan and Korea did 
during its growth period. Lenovo has no experience in overseas acquisitions, which is 
why the company has planned to keep IBM managers acting as mentors to the Chinese. 
By keeping Western management, Chinese companies like Lenovo can focus on growth 
rather than attempting to start-up its own PC division, which can be costly, inefficient, 
and uncompetitive. One can only begin to wonder how many more Chinese companies 
may go out and buy other cross-border firms (Holstein, 2005). 
 
Stock Market and Equity Prices 
 As noted earlier, the East Asian countries saw an appreciation in equity prices 
prior to the Crisis of 19979. Some economists suggest that a bubble was formed in which 
a crash in the Asian stock markets was inevitable. When looking at the historical moving 
averages of the Stock Exchange of Thailand Index, Korea’s Kospi Index, Hong Kong’s 
Hang Seng Index, Indonesia’s Jakarta Composite Index, Singapore’s Straight Index, and 
the Philippines Composite Index, there is a sharp drop occurring in the year 1997. Before 
that, there was a steady increase in the value of indexes from 1992 to 1996. Although 
some countries show less of a decline than others, it is indicative that the East Asian 
stock indexes experienced first inflation then a deflation in asset prices. 
                                                
9 See Bloomberg graphs of Moving Average from January 1992-December 2005 (page 48). 
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 China’s Shenzhen and Shanghai indexes, on the other hand, saw just a fractional 
deflation in equity prices during that same time period. In fact, China withstood the crisis 
and began to appreciate until June 2001. If one was to look at only the moving average 
graphs for China’s stock markets, one might have never have seen the correlation 
between East Asia and China. However, the stock market of Shenzhen has yet to reach 
the six-year high price set in June 2001. In fact, the Shenzhen composite index is at a 
level equivalent to the level of early 1996. Although the market has not recovered fully, 
this might be good news for China. Despite the long six-year price fall, the economy is 
still growing at a monstrous pace. Even if equity prices fall further, it seems as though it 
will not further affect the growth of the economy. The worst may already be over. 
 
Current Account Imbalances 
 For most of the 1990s, many of the East Asian countries were experiencing a 
current account deficit. In fact, every country but Singapore was in deficit10. It was not 
until after the Asian Financial Crisis of 97 in 1998 that the countries finally turned deficit 
into surplus as a percentage of GDP. Only until recently, many believed that these current 
account imbalances were benign and would not affect the external-sector of these 
countries (Goldstein and Institute for International Economics (U.S.), 1998). In fact, it 
was considered that these kinds of deficit were good for two reasons: one, they did not 
reflect a saving-investment deficit in the public sector and two, foreign borrowing was 
being used mainly to increase investment, which would result in building the capacity to 
service the debts that it created. Compared to the Latin American current account 
balances, the Asian deficits were thought to be more sustainable.  
                                                
10 See Table 8. Current Account Balance (Appendix – page 43) 
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There are three major ways that a growing current account deficit can hurt a 
country in the long run (Rakshit, 2002). First, if foreign borrowing is used to finance 
domestic consumption rather than investment, the country will eventually face difficulties 
servicing the debt. As in China, its recent rally in June 2005 was essentially due to the 
renewed interest by foreign firms (Browne, 2006). Although the rally may not be 
sustained due to a lack of domestic interest in the stock market, foreign investors are 
increasingly hopeful to get more opportunities from the government in order to obtain 
more Class A shares, which are currently limited to foreigners. As of now, outsiders must 
buy separate foreign-currency denominated Class B shares that are priced independently 
of Class A shares (Lardy, 1999). Even if foreigners’ tastes turn sour on the value of B 
shares, it will have no negative consequences on the value of the Yuan because potential 
sellers cannot exit the market unless they have found a foreign buyer who will pay dollars 
for the shares. China’s future looks healthy as these external funds are not funding 
domestic consumption, and rather investment. 
Second, even if all the external borrowing was added to domestic capital 
formation, then widespread inefficiency in the use of the external funds may make the 
returns too low to repay foreign creditors. If the managers are unable to manage the 
money efficiently, it will only cause further debt. Third, productivity of investment in 
physical terms is not what is relevant; instead an addition to foreign exchange earnings in 
relation to the requirement of servicing external debt is needed. A borrowing country 
must be able to convert the additional capacity and convert it into extra earnings in terms 
of foreign currency. 
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It is vital for a country to be able to service its foreign debt in order for its 
economy to thrive. This ability increases foreign investor confidence in the banking 
system and thus increases foreign investment. However, if a borrowing country is unable 
to service its debt, speculators may have a field day in selling short its currencies, while 
selling off its assets. Figure 5a and 5b show Thailand and Indonesia a large external debt 
to GDP ratio. China’s external debt to GDP ratio is very low at under 0.20. Mexico, who 
experienced a currency crisis in 1994, shows that its foreign debt was over twenty times 
the amount of foreign reserves it had in stock. China, compared to the other East Asian 
countries, have plenty of reserves to service its foreign debt11. 
 Singapore, who escaped the crisis bruised but not crushed, shows a strong surplus 
in Table 812. If the current account deficit in these countries caused concerns leading up 
to the crisis, it may be good news for China’s economic future. Over the last decade, it 
has been able to maintain a surplus. Like Singapore, it appears that China will have no 
apparent concerns regarding its current account balance and the data suggests none in the 
future as well. 
In fact, it may be because of China that the other EA countries experienced those 
deficits. Certain economists show a shift in regional comparative advantage toward China 
and away from the East Asian economies. Thurow (1998) argues that the EA deficit from 
surplus is directly traceable to China’s decision to focus on increasing exports as its 
engine of growth. In addition, Kwan (1997) states that the share of Japanese FDI going to 
China was strongly on the rise between 1992 and 1995-96, whereas the share entering the 
EA countries were constant. He also notes that the product compositions of exports are 
                                                
11 Figure 5a & 5b. External Debt (Appendix – page 41). 
12 Table 8. Current Account Balance (Appendix – page 43). 
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“similar” to Chinese exports and thus are disadvantageous to the East Asian countries, 
specifically Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. 
 
Banking Deposit Insurance: In Korea and Singapore 
 Bank deposits were implicitly guaranteed by the government, given that no 
domestic bank had ever closed, as the government would take over any failing banks or 
forced the bank to merge with another (Dekle and Kletzer, 2001). Even foreign loans to 
the domestic banking sector were implicitly guaranteed because of this system. However, 
instead of exercising restraint, local banks re-lent monies borrowed from abroad to 
speculative investments in real estate or to protected and noncompetitive enterprises 
(Jackson, 1999). 
In Korea, although banks were privatized in the early 1980s and financial markets 
were deregulated, the governments had control since it appointed bank management and 
used a system of government policy loans. Because the Korean government was so 
heavily involved in lending, banks were unable to develop skills in credit analysis. The 
government was basically implicitly guaranteeing any loans, given the fact that it was in 
charge of lending the money itself. This indirectly led its way to increasing the number of 
dreaded non-performing loans. In addition to government intervention, the sheer 
economic power of the few large conglomerates, such as Samsung, LG, Daewoo, led to 
inefficiencies (Borensztein and Lee, 1999). These chaebols dominated credit allocation 
and basically ignored the need for project evaluation and monitoring by banks. The story 
is that these chaebols were traditionally considered to be “too big to fail,” thus financial 
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institutions believed that the government would protect them from failure, implying again 
a guaranteed loan.  
In Singapore, where the crisis did not hurt as much, it also had no official deposit 
insurance system. However, government regulations have prevented domestic 
corporations from borrowing offshore in domestic currency. Due to its large saving and 
low interest rate levels, foreign currency borrowing was minimal and not guaranteed by 
the government implicitly or explicitly. The large savings allowed banks to keep a close 
watch on bad loans and also kept companies from over-borrowing. Unlike Korea, the 
Singaporean government did not imply any guaranteed loans lent by its corporations.  
 
Chinese Banking Deposit Insurance 
 China has four major banks, also known as the Big Four – Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of 
China. Similar to Korea, it is also implied that the government has guaranteed loans from 
these banks, as these are state-owned banks. In January 2004, the Chinese cabinet 
completed a US$45 billion injection into the Bank of China and the China Construction 
Bank out of its foreign exchange reserve (“China's Government Began a Long-
awaited…,” 2004). It hoped to allow the state-owned banks to lessen the current and 
potential financial risks. By doing so, the government wants to keep healthy balance 
sheets that would normally be laden in bad loans.  
These state-owned commercial banks, although set for initial public offerings and 
controlled by some major foreign investment banks13, are still majority owned by the 
                                                
13 Bank of America owns a 9 percent stake in the China Construction Bank and Goldman Sachs owns a 10 
percent stake in the Bank of China 
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government (Linebaugh, 2006). Foreign companies can own a maximum of 25 percent 
stake. This will give an implicit guarantee on its loans. This implicit deposit guarantee is 
important to the confidence in the banking system for macroeconomic and social stability.  
It becomes clear that the main challenges for the banks are to improve their commercial 
position and strengthen their financial position (Prasad, 2004). 
 
East Asian Bank Lending 
 Dekle and Kletzer (2001) argue that reliance on bank borrowing can lead to a 
crisis if done in excess, thereby causing financial instability with the domestic banking 
system. In the East Asian countries, corporations in Korea depended heavily on domestic 
bank borrowing; Thai companies were also reliant on bank borrowing but included 
domestic and foreign debt, while Malaysian, Taiwanese, and Singaporean firms were not 
reliant on bank borrowing relative to the others. The latter actively tapped bond and 
equity markets to raise capital for its investment projects.  
 Korean corporations’ reliance on domestic, commercial, and merchant bank 
financing was large and increasing prior to the 1997 Crisis. In 1997, domestic borrowing 
was close to 50 percent of total corporate financing. Equity financing was limited and 
accounted for only 7 percent of total corporate financing, down from 20 percent in the 
early 1990s. Consequently, the debt-equity ratios was over 300 percent for manufacturing 
firms, and most of this debt was explicitly or implicitly owed to domestic banks 
(Pomerleano, 1998). The Korean government saw the financial sector as the ideal 
instrument for pursuing its industrial policy. The government allocated credit and 
preferential lending rates. This allowed for heavy subsidies for the firms who had access 
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to bank credit. The beneficiaries of the selective credit allocations were the chaebol 
groups, who were not wise with their major investment decisions (Borensztein and Lee, 
1999). 
 Thailand’s reliance on bank financing was among the highest of the afflicted East 
Asian countries. Between 1992 and 1996, borrowing from banks accounted for 74 
percent of total corporate financing and the average debt-equity ratio was 180 percent 
(Pomerleano, 1998). A large percentage of the borrowing was from foreign banks, mostly 
Japanese. Much of the foreign borrowing was through the Bangkok International Banking 
Facility (BIBF), who used an “out-in” approach, where lending was entirely foreign 
currency denominated. This would normally cause problems in a pre-crisis situation 
because if the country does not have enough foreign reserves to cover the foreign debt, it 
can cause downward pressure on the domestic currency. 
 By 1996, Taiwanese reliance on bank borrowing was less than 22 percent of total 
corporate financing (Dekle and Kletzer, 2001). Large corporations raised most of its 
funds through the equity market and thus developed a successful venture capital industry 
and IPO market. In 1997, small and medium-sized firms raised $2 billion and $27 billion 
from venture capital and IPOs, respectively (Chu and Yasu, 1999). By the same time, the 
debt-equity ratio was 85 percent, lower than even the debt-equity ratios in many 
industrialized countries.  
 Singapore raised 40 percent from banks between 1992 and 1996. 80 percent of 
those loans were from four domestic banks. The remaining 20 percent were from smaller 
banks, foreign banks, and finance companies (Pomerleano, 1998). Fortunately, Singapore 
regulations have kept domestic currency and foreign currency separate despite having a 
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large offshore market. Singapore corporations have also relied on bond and equity 
financing, which have kept the debt-equity ratio below 90 percent. 
 
Chinese Bank Lending 
China’s bank-dominated financial systems can pose a problem for the country in 
the near future. Lardy (1999) argues that first, an under-developed capital market creates 
a potential for systematic under-pricing of loans by banks. This poses a threat to the 
banking system because it contributes to the excessive growth of credit. In a bank-
dominated financial system, capital markets do no provide sufficient competition for 
banks, lowering the efficiency of financial intermediation. Also, it is easier for corruption 
to influence the pattern of bank lending when politicians can determine which borrowers 
receive funds. Table 11 shows the increase of domestic credit for China and the East 
Asian countries14. China has had the most drastic increase over the ten year period, 1994 
to 2003, while some countries like Indonesia have shown a decrease in domestic credit. 
It is believed that credit expansion in China has been excessive based on several 
criteria. First, excessive bank credit is shown by a deterioration in the balance sheets of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Since the 1978 reforms began, the SOEs had only 
moderate liabilities to banks as most of the fixed investment was financed through the 
government budget and these firms had no obligation to repay the grants. Early on in the 
reform period, the debt-equity ratio was only 12 percent, a fraction compared to the 
crisis-afflicted EA countries. That number has severely increased to 375 percent by the 
end of 1994, due to an increase in bank borrowing. By year-end 1995, SOEs, including 
                                                
14 Table 11 and Figure 12. Domestic Credit (Appendix – page 44-45). 
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commercial and other establishments and manufacturing firms, had a debt-equity ratio of 
over 500 percent (Lardy, 1998). 
The deterioration in the balance sheets has three significant implications on an 
economy. First, a large portion of the SOEs are insolvent. Second, many firms are not 
able to cover their operating costs with the income received from selling its products. 
They are not only borrowing to finance expansion but also paying for wages, taxes, and a 
growing stock of inventory of unsold goods (Jianming, 1996). Lastly, Chinese enterprises 
are highly leveraged that a dip in the economy could cause liquidity problems for banks. 
A high debt-equity ratio in a poor economy makes it difficult to pay the interest on their 
debts with its earnings, increasing a possibility of bankruptcy. 
Even more recently, the need to keep the SOEs running continues to influence 
bank lending. Like Korea, government-mandated lending along with weak contract 
enforcement has created an indistinct credit culture, which banks have had limited 
incentives to maintain strict lending standards and enforce loan contracts (Pigott and 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002). These “soft budget 
constraints” led to over-investment which created excess and inefficient capacity that 
plagues the economy. Thus, what has occurred is that bank lending has become a 
substitute for government spending since government tax revenue has dropped over the 
years. 
On a positive note, in 1996, China enacted a banking law that led to a significant 
tightening of bank lending standards by improving internal controls and tightening 
accountability by holding loan officers and management responsible for new problem 
loans. With the likes of Bank of America and Goldman Sachs buying ownership shares of 
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the state-owned commercial banks, one can be sure that the banks’ management will look 
to influence lending decisions. Foreign banks are likely to be more selective in their 
activities and largely avoid lending to domestic enterprises until their performance 
improves. With China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, tighter restrictions 
and clearer guidelines will be beneficial to the performance of Chinese banks and its 
lending structure. The WTO will require the opening of banks to foreign investors by the 
end of 2006. This will help the banks run more efficiently and more cooperatively in the 
international marketplace (Pasha, 2006). 
  
Nonperforming Loans 
 Ernst & Young wrote in 2000, “If Asian governments, asset management 
companies, and banks succeed in moving nearly $1.5 trillion of nonperforming loans 
(NPLs) off their books and into the private sector over the next few years, Asia will 
emerge as the world’s growth engine, fueled by eCommerce and foreign investment.” 
(Ernst & Young, 2002) This report on nonperforming loans included China and Japan 
along with the other discussed East Asian countries. A nonperforming loan is a loan that 
is not earning income and: (1) full payment of principal and interest is no longer 
anticipated, (2) principal or interest is 90 days or more delinquent, or (3) the maturity 
date has passed and payment in full has not been made15. 
 Dekle and Kletzer (2001) predict that when the ratio of lending to GDP rises, the 
quality of bank portfolios will decline. For example, in the mid 1980s, Korean banks had 
a large share of NPLs, due to the government’s attempt to increase its chemical and 
                                                
15 Definition from the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Thrift Supervision Glossary 
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heavy industries. By the end of the 80s with the industries in decent condition, the share 
of NPLs decreased. They also state that the trend in the share of NPLs gives a measure of 
the quality of bank portfolios. However, given the differences in NPL accounting 
standards, one must view cross-country data with some caution. 
 The overextension of credit within the East Asian economies made them 
vulnerable to a shift in credit and cyclical conditions. This shift can be caused by an 
export slowdown and when attempting to defend exchange rates. In Asia, this happened 
prior to the crisis (Goldstein and Institute for International Economics (U.S.), 1998). In 
Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia, analysts noted extreme banking difficulties with 
shares of nonperforming loans totaling from a 15 to 35 percent range. Hong Kong and 
Singapore fared well and were not as fragile due to their already strong banking systems. 
 Similar to the EA countries that were devastated by the crisis, China too has a 
large share of NPLs. Lardy states that by year-end 1997, the ratio of NPLs to total loans 
in China were also higher than in Korea and Thailand (Lardy, 1999). An Ernst & Young 
study in 2002 shows China’s ratio of NPLs as percent of GDP is substantially higher than 
in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan 16  (Ernst & Young, 2002). However, China’s NPL 
classifications are not based on international standards. The system will have an 
inaccurate account of the true share of NPLs in the country, so the true amount of NPLs 
may be much higher than the official data (Lardy, 1999). If the loan values of the state-
owned commercial banks were valued realistically, these institutions would have 
negative capital (Pigott and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2002). Lardy (1998) also argues that if China fails to deal with the NPL banking problem 
                                                
16 Figure 13. Nonperforming Loans, % of GDP (Appendix – page 45) 
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quickly, it would handicap reform efforts and run the risk of igniting a domestic bank run 
by lower saving and hindering efficient allocation of resources. 
 In 2000, China made an effort to address the NPL issue. They transferred RMB 
1.3 trillion (~ US$ 150 billion) of its NPLs to bank asset management companies 
(BAMC). By making BAMCs, it will also allow itself to enter international capital 
markets in search of an investor willing to buy up its NPLs. The Korean Asset 
Management Corporation (KAMCO) and the Financial Sector Restructuring Authority 
(FRA) in Thailand succeeded early on by gathering the NPLs in their country and 
offering them to foreign investors at market clearing prices (Ernst & Young, 2002). 
 However, if an economic downturn hypothetically happened in China, the share 
of nonperforming loans would likely rise. Declining values of the renminbi in respect to 
the U.S. dollar would increase the burden of debt repayment for firms that have borrowed 
in US$ and not hedged against the possibility of a renminbi depreciation. Fortunately, 
renminbi devaluation is unlikely in the short run as China is keen on devaluing its 
currency slowly and with its own timing, minus the pressure to devalue by the U.S. 
government. Thus, the escalation of nonperforming loans is not an immediate policy 
threat to the current economic status. 
 
The Speculative Currency Attack 
 Most rich Western countries moved to a floating currency during the 1970s and 
early 80s, but smaller, poorer developing countries used a pegged exchange rate, usually 
to the US dollar. This characteristic gave certain stability to the domestic currency. 
However, this could only continue to be beneficial if the United States was the main 
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source of capital and also the main market for a country’s products. It was the emergence 
of Japan as the leading Asian investor and key target market that may have caused issues 
with the exchange rate policy (Garran, 1998). When the Japanese yen began to appreciate 
against the US dollar in the mid 80s to early 90s, it was the East Asian countries that 
were benefiting. It made their prices more competitive compared to Japan with their 
weaker currency. However, the high yen was causing strain on Japan as it had been hit by 
a recession in the late 1980s and the speculative bubble and thus about to hit the East 
Asian economies when American and Japanese officials met to engineer a turnaround. 
 Beginning in Thailand, speculators began to question if the fixed exchange rate 
system would hold up or not, due to the increasing worry over external debt. Speculators 
then attacked the Thai baht on May 14, 1997. The Bank of Thailand had used much of its 
foreign-US dollar reserves to meet the demands of everyone who wanted to sell baht and 
buy dollars (Garran, 1998). It claimed to have in excess of $30 billion after the sell-off. 
Unfortunately, the Bank of Thailand had committed that $30 billion in forward futures 
contracts, meaning it actually did not have the money to buy back the baht if another 
attack were to happen. On July 2, 1997, the central bank let the baht float and by the end 
of the month, it lost 40 percent of the value. 
 Malaysia also experienced a hit on its currency, the ringgit, shortly after 
Thailand’s baht. Due to its heavy borrowings, although not as high as Thailand’s, 
confidence crumbled. A few days after Thailand’s floating exchange rate announcement, 
the ringgit was attacked and the central bank had to buy ringgit which also depleted much 
of its currency reserves. 
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 Like Thailand and Malaysia, the Bank of Korea was intervening heavily to keep 
the currency stable. Investors, nervous from the slump in Hong Kong’s Hang Seng stock 
market, turned to Korea and again saw weaknesses in its major conglomerations or 
chaebols. On October 20, 1997, the weakness in the financial structure, the high debts of 
the chaebols and banks, and an increasing current account deficit made things worse; 
foreign investors pulled their money out. When 1997 started, investors had begun to fear 
that the foreign debt would not be repaid. By mid-1997, Korea’s short-term debt was 
three times the size of its reserves. 
 Singapore, however, was happy to let its currency slide as soon as it began to lose 
its value. And it continued to lose value just like Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea. 
However, investors liked Singapore response to the crisis in that unlike Malaysia, no 
threats were made to foreign investors like George Soros17, the stock market was still 
liquid, and political leaders boldly declared that the market would value its currency, 
according to a Political and Economic Risk Consultancy report in November 1997. It also 
had low levels of debt compared to its neighbors, current account surpluses, and 
substantial foreign reserves. 
 
The Importance of Foreign Reserves 
 Economist Paul Krugman states that a government can succeed for a time being in 
stabilizing a currency if they have a large enough foreign reserve capacity. But if reserves 
begin to dwindle, there will come a day when the central bank can no longer sell its 
currency at the promised rate. He also believes that currency runs are not due to the 
                                                
17 George Soros, a hedge fund manager, was accused of making the Asian Crisis worse by intensifying the 
selling of the Thai baht and Malaysian ringgit, which caused added pressure on the currencies. 
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irrational investor or financial manipulation, but the result of rational investors simply 
considering the implications of unsustainable policies. 
 Hong Kong escaped with only a few financial bruises due to the backing of the 
Chinese government. In the four days in October 1997, the Hang Seng stock market lost 
23 percent of its value. Like the baht and ringgit, the Hong Kong dollar was fixed to the 
US dollar and there also was immense pressure on the currency. Hong Kong too had high 
levels of debt, and when the interest rates were raised, it was painful for the high-
leveraged borrowers. However, China had communicated to Hong Kong that it was 
prepared to spend $50 billion to defend the HK dollar, which helped boost the confidence 
that the fixed exchange rate would hold. Luckily, it worked. Thanks to China, Hong 
Kong had survived any serious damage. 
 So how did China escape a speculative currency attack? First, China’s foreign 
exchange market is not open to those who are out to buy currency. Only buyers with a 
demonstrated need related to trade, tourism, and repatriation of profits derived from a 
prior direct investment, or repayment from foreign currency loan are allowed to purchase 
foreign exchange (Lardy, 1999). Also, because there is a limited forward market, 
speculators cannot hold short positions on the renminbi. Even domestic firms are not 
allowed to repay their loans in foreign currency until the loan is actually due. 
 Second and most importantly, China had sufficient foreign exchange reserves if 
needing to buy back its currency. Figure 14 shows that in 1997, its foreign reserves to 
total debt ratio was nearly 100 percent, enough to finance a whole year of imports, while 
the countries of Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand lacked far behind and in fact, 
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decreased its ratio18. Since then, China has amassed even more foreign reserves compared 
to its debt and is over 100 percent. Even if a currency crisis were to hit China in the short 
term, it does not appear that it will cause any major concern to the central bank as it has 
limited capital account convertibility and more than enough foreign reserves on hand if 
needed to protect its current peg of 8.024 Yuan to the US dollar19. 
 
Conclusion 
 Almost every major investment bank has stated its interest in the Chinese market 
over the last few years. With its entry into the WTO, foreign banks will be allowed to 
operate in any part of the country, which opens up possibilities in new markets with a 
customer base of 1.3 billion people (Pasha, 2006). This is not an unfamiliar theme in Asia, 
however. As demonstrated throughout this analysis, there are still areas of concern. High 
levels of nonperforming loans will continue to eat away at bank balance sheets and long 
term growth may begin to slow down as education and R&D are at low levels. In East 
Asia following the recovery, the markets were for the most part, up and running within 
two years of the crisis20. Although placed in a more difficult standing due to the IMF 
recovery package, the afflicted countries were rapid in reforming the necessary banking 
inefficiencies. Historically, China has not shown any urgency in its reforms and has 
stated that change will occur gradually. 
  Overall, China seems prepared to handle any negative pressures on the economy. 
It has an abundance of foreign reserves to service any foreign debt and has the capability 
to protect the yuan from any speculative selling. The legal framework of its capital 
                                                
18 Figure 14. Foreign Reserves to Total Debt Ratio (page 46) 
19 Exchange rate as of April 18, 2006. 
20 Bloomberg graphs (page 48). 
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market has also protected itself from any attacks on the currency. Also, despite the recent 
six year decrease in its stock markets, China has managed to have an average of 9 percent 
annual growth over the last several years. With the acquisitions of Western companies 
and the inclusion of Western management, China can learn new and more efficient 
methods of running businesses and can continue being competitive on the global market. 
If all the positives continue and there is a reduction in the inefficiencies of the economy, 
China’s future looks clear for the time being. 
 Table 15 gives a side-by-side comparison of the major East Asian countries 
affected by the Crisis and China21. The data again shows Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong with positive ratios while Thailand and Korea show highly negative ratios. Because 
one of the biggest factors that caused the Crisis was the lack of foreign currency reserves, 
the table gives more weight to this category. The current state of the Chinese economy 
suggests that there are factors that require some caution, similar to pre-crisis East Asia. 
Overall though, it appears that China will be able to be able to protect its economy from 
financial dangers, especially any attack on the renminbi.  
 
                                                
21 Table 15. Side-by-side Comparison (Appendix – page 47). 
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Table 3a. Employment by Sector 
         
 China Korea Republic Singapore Japan 
 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 
         
Agriculture 69 48 34 10 1.3 0.3 10 5 
Industry 18 23 28 27 36 25 35 30 
Services 13 27 47^ 63 63 74 54 64 
         
         
ˆ Data for 1990         
-May not total to 100% due to rounding procedures      
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators      
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Table 3d. Arable Land (as a % of land area) 
        
China Korea Republic Singapore Japan 
1980 2002 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 
10.39 14.70 20.86 17.40 2.99 1.49 13.31 12.27 
        
        
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators     
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Table 4. Ranking System by Institutional Quality 
East Asian Countries 
 1985 Rank 1990 Rank 1995 Rank 2000 Rank 2002 Rank Avg Rank˚ Overall Rank 
CHINA 68 4 58.5 7 72.5 7 73.8 7 75 7 6.4 7 
HONG KONG 74 3 66 6 80.5 4 79.3 2 84.3 3 3.6 3 
             
KOREA 64 6 74.5 4 85* 3 78 3 79.8 4 4 4 
SINGAPORE 77.5 2 84 2 86 2 75.8 4 90 1 2.2 2 
MALAYSIA 68 4 77.5 3 80.5 4 75.8 4 77.5 5 4 4 
THAILAND 59 7 69 5 77 6 75.3 6 76.3 6 6 6 
JAPAN 87 1 87 1 86 1 83.8 1 85.3 2 1.2 1 
             
ARGENTINA 40.5 8 58 8 71.5 8 68.8 8 48 8 8 8 
             
(1=highest score, 8=lowest score)          
˚ Average rank from 1985 to 2002, Overall rank (1-8)       
* Used 1996 value            
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators        
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Figure 5a. External Debt to GDP Ratio
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Figure 5b. External Debt to International Reserves Ratio
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Table 6. FDI Inflow in China (1979-1999) 
   
 Contracted FDI Utilized FDI 
 (US$ billion) (US$ billion) 
   
1979-1983 7.742 1.802 
1984 2.651 1.258 
1985 5.932 1.661 
1986 2.834 1.874 
1987 3.709 2.314 
1988 5.297 3.194 
1989 5.600 3.392 
1990 6.596 3.487 
1991 11.977 4.366 
1992 58.122 11.007 
1993 111.436 27.515 
1994 82.680 33.767 
1995 91.282 37.521 
1996 73.276 41.725 
1997 51.004 45.257 
1998 52.102 45.463 
1999 41.200 40.400 
Total 608 307 
   
Source: Wang, H. and China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing: China Statistics Press, various years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Exports to GDP Ratio 
      
  Exports as a percentage of GDP  
Country Name  1996  2002  
China  21.0  28.9  
Indonesia  25.8  35.4  
Korea, Rep.  29.5  40.0  
Hong Kong, China  139.8  150.8  
Malaysia  91.6  114.1  
Philippines  40.5  48.9  
Singapore  132.9  --  
Thailand  39.3  64.7  
      
      
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators & IMF, International Financial Statistics 
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Table 8. Current Account Balance (as % of GDP) 
     
 1990-1995* 1996 1997 1998 
China 1.21% 0.89% 4.12% 3.33% 
     
Indonesia -2.34% -3.37% -2.27% 4.29% 
Korea Republic -1.21% -4.42% -1.71% 12.73% 
Hong Kong, China -- -- -- 2.68% 
Malaysia -5.74% -4.42% -5.93% 13.20% 
Philippines -3.84% -4.77% -5.28% 2.37% 
Singapore 12.10% 15.16% 15.63% 22.64% 
Thailand -6.78% -8.09% -2.00% 12.73% 
     
     
* Data is the average percentages (1990-1995)    
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Change in Merchandise Exports (annual growth %) 
      
 1991-1995* 1996 1997 1998 1999 
China 19.36% 1.52% 21.02% 0.50% 6.11% 
      
Hong Kong 16.22% 4.03% 4.04% -7.47% -0.07% 
Indonesia 12.13% 9.68% 13.02% -10.53% 1.73% 
Korea 14.30% 3.72% 4.97% -2.83% 8.59% 
Malaysia 20.28% 5.97% 0.53% -6.97% 15.52% 
Philippines 16.89% 16.60% 21.93% 18.21% 24.35% 
Singapore 17.81% 5.70% -0.02% -12.07% 4.35% 
Thailand 19.69% -1.27% 2.91% -5.00% 7.33% 
      
      
* Data is the average percentages (1990-1995)    
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics    
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Table 10. Research and Development (% of GDP) 
       
Country Name 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
China 0.60 0.68 0.70 0.83 1.00 1.09 
       
Korea, Rep. 2.60 2.69 2.55 2.47 2.68 2.96 
Malaysia 0.22 .. 0.40 .. .. .. 
Singapore 1.39 1.50 1.80 1.87 1.89 2.11 
Thailand 0.12 0.10 .. .. .. .. 
Hong Kong, China .. 0.27 0.44 .. .. .. 
       
United States 2.55 2.58 2.60 2.64 2.70 2.80 
Japan 2.77 2.83 2.94 2.94 2.98 3.09 
       
       
       
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Domestic Credit (% of GDP) 
           
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
China 0.92 0.91 0.97 1.06 1.21 1.29 1.33 1.37 1.62 1.71 
           
Hong Kong 1.40 1.42 1.53 1.63 1.46 1.37 1.36 1.39 1.43 1.46 
Indonesia 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.54 0.51 0.49 
Korea Republic 0.55 0.54 0.57 0.64 0.73 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.94 0.97 
Malaysia 0.82 0.93 1.08 1.27 1.23 1.14 1.11 1.16 1.16 1.18 
Philippines 0.48 0.56 0.68 0.79 0.70 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 
Singapore 0.58 0.62 0.66 0.73 0.89 0.86 0.79 0.94 0.77 0.83 
Thailand 0.91 0.97 1.01 1.32 1.33 1.27 1.11 1.00 1.02 0.96 
           
           
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45
 
Figure 12. Domestic Credit
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Figure 13. Nonperforming Loans (% of GDP) in 2002
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Figure 14. Foreign Reserves to Total Debt
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Table 15. Side-by-side Comparison of Asian Economies 
        
 Korea 
Hong 
Kong Malaysia Thailand Singapore Taiwan China 
        
Education spending        
        
Employment in Industry 
& Services rather than 
Agriculture        
        
Private-public 
Cooperation        
        
Institutional Quality -  -     
        
Research and 
Development        
        
Current Account 
Balance        
        
Stock Market Prices        
        
Banking Deposit 
Insurance       - 
        
Bank Lending       - 
        
Nonperforming Loans        
        
Domestic Credit to GDP        
        
Foreign Reserve 
Capacity        
                
        
Total 38 64 35 28 93 42 65 
        
        
    indicates a negative factor on growth or a financial weakness 
    indicates a positive factor on growth or a financial strength 
 indicates a highly positive factor on growth or financial strength 
-     indicates that it is neither beneficial or detrimental to the economy     
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Singapore – STI Straits Times Index (Bloomberg 2006) 
 
 
 
 
Taiwan – TWSE Taiex Index (Bloomberg 2006) 
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Korea Republic – Kospi Index (Bloomberg 2006) 
 
 
 
 
Hong Kong – HSI Hang Seng Index (Bloomberg 2006) 
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Thailand – SET Stock Exchange of Thailand Index (Bloomberg 2006) 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia – KLCI Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (Bloomberg 2006) 
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China – SHCOMP Shanghai Composite Index (Bloomberg 2006) 
 
 
 
China – SZCOMP Shenzhen Composite Index (Bloomberg 2006) 
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